State of Utah v. Michael Shakeel Peterson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
State of Utah v. Michael Shakeel Peterson : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randall W. Richards; PDA of Weber County; Counsel for Appellant.
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Counsel
for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Peterson, No. 20050322 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5736
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL SHAKEEL PETERSON, Case No. 20050322-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINDING OF GUILTY OF ONE COUNT OF 
FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP, A THIRD-
DEGREE FELONY IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A.§41-6A-210 (41-6-13.5), 
ONE COUNT OF INTERFERENCE WITH AN ARRESTING OFFICER, 
A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A.§76-8-305 
(1953) AS AMENDED, ONE COUNT OF DRIVING ON A SUSPENDED 
LICENSE, A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. 
§53-3-337(l)(1953) AS AMENDED, AND ONE COUNT OF SPEEDING, A 
CLASS C MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. §41-6A-210 (41-
6-62). THE TRIAL COURT SITTING WITH A JURY FOUND THE 
DEFENDANT GUILTY ON ALL COUNTS ON JANUARY 26,2005. IN 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE JOHN R. MORRIS, 
PRESIDING. 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS (4503) 
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ASSOCIATION, INC. OF WEBER 
COUNTY 
2550 Washington Boulevard, Ste 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Telephone: (801)399-4191 FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
SEP 0 8 2005 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
irTArr^PPE^f \ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL SHAKEEL PETERSON, Case No. 20050322-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINDING OF GUILTY OF ONE COUNT OF FAILURE 
TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP, A THIRD-DEGREE 
FELONY IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A.§41-6A-210 (41-6-13.5), ONE COUNT 
OF INTERFERENCE WITH AN ARRESTING OFFICER, A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A.§76-8-305 (1953) AS 
AMENDED, ONE COUNT OF DRIVING ON A SUSPENDED LICENSE, A 
CLASS C MISDEMEANOR IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. §53-3-337(l)(1953) 
AS AMENDED, AND ONE COUNT OF SPEEDING, A CLASS C 
MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF U.C.A. §41-6A-210 (41-6-62). THE 
TRIAL COURT SITTING WITH A JURY FOUND THE DEFENDANT 
GUILTY ON ALL COUNTS ON JANUARY 26, 2005. IN THE SECOND 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, HONORABLE JOHN R. MORRIS, PRESIDING. 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS (4503) 
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
ASSOCIATION, INC. OF WEBER 
COUNTY 
2550 Washington Boulevard, Ste 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801)366-0100 Telephone: (801)399-4191 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE 
DEFENDANT OF FAILING TO STOP AT THE 
COMMAND OF A POLICE OFFICER AND 
INTERFERING WITH A LEGAL 
ARREST 8 
CONCLUSION 13 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 14 
ADDENDA: 
Addendum A: Sentence, Judgment and Commitment 
.1 
1 
3 
.4 
5 
7 
.8 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
UTAH STATE CASES 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342,345 (Utah 1985) 8,9 
State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352,355(Utah Ct. App. 1995) 2 
State v. Gonzales, 2 P.3d 954,959 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) 11,12,13 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150,1156 (Utah 1992) 2 
State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60,61 (Utah 1987) 9 
State v. Mead 27 P.3d 1115,1132 (Utah 2001) 9 
State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399,402 (Utah 1980) 11 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,444,445,446 (Utah 1983) 8,10 
State v. Rudolph, 3 P.3d 192,196 (2000) 9 
State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94,100 (Utah 2002) 11 
State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 12 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981,984,985 (Utah 1993) 9 
STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§41-6-13.5 1,3 
§41-6-46 1,3 
§53-3-227(1) 1,3,4 
§76-8-305 1,4 
§77-17-3 4,9 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH. : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
: Case No. 20050322-CA 
MICHAEL SHAKEEL PETERSON, : 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Failure to 
Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop, a third-degree felony in violation of 
U.C.A. §41-6-13.51(1953) as amended, one count of Interference with an 
Arresting Officer, a Class B misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §76-8-
305(1953) as amended, one count of Driving on a Suspended License, a Class 
C misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §53-3-227(l)(1953) as amended, and 
one count of Speeding, a Class C misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §41-6-
46 (1953) as amended. The trial court sitting with a jury found the Defendant 
guilty on all counts on January 26, 2005. This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(e). 
1
 Renumbered in 2005 as §41-6a-210 
2
 Renumbered in 2005 as § 41-6a-601 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Point I 
WAS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF 
FAILING TO STOP AT THE COMMAND OF A POLICE 
OFFICER AND INTERFERING WITH A LEGAL 
ARREST? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a matter of 
law and fact whether the evidence at trial supported the defendant's conviction. 
"When examining the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal jury trial, we 
begin with the threshold issue of statutory interpretation, which we decide as a 
matter of law. With regard to the facts, 'we review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict of the jury.'" State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 355(Utah Ct. App. 
1995)(quoting State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah 1992)(citations 
omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE ON APPEAL: This issue was properly 
preserved for appeal by the timely motion to dismiss made by defense counsel 
at the close of the State's case. (R. 79 /110). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
§41-6-13.5. (Renumbered in 2005 as §41-6a-210.) Failure to respond to 
officer's signal to stop ~ Fleeing — 
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(1) (a) An operator who receives a visual or audible signal from a peace 
officer to bring the vehicle to a stop may not: 
(i) operate the vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to 
interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person; or 
(ii) attempt to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or other means. 
(b) (i) A person who violates Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a felony of the 
third degree. 
§41-6-46 (Renumbered in 2005 as § 41-6a-601.) Speed regulations — Safe 
and appropriate speeds at certain locations — Prima facie speed limits — 
Emergency power of the governor. 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable 
and prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and 
potential hazards then existing, including when: 
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing; 
(b) approaching and going around a curve; 
(c) approaching a hill crest; 
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and 
(e) approaching other hazards that exist due to pedestrians, other traffic, 
weather, or highway conditions. 
(2) Subject to Subsections (1) and (4) and Sections 41-6a-602 and 41-6a-
603, the following speeds are lawful: 
(a) 20 miles per hour in a reduced speed school zone as defined in Section 
41-6a-303; 
(b) 25 miles per hour in any urban district; and 
(c) 55 miles per hour in other locations. 
(3) Except as provided in Section 41-6a-604, any speed in excess of the 
limits provided in this section or established under Sections 41-6a-602 and 41-
6a-603 is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable or prudent and 
that it is unlawful. 
§53-3-227(l)Driving a motor vehicle prohibited while driving privilege 
denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked — Penalties. 
(1) A person whose driving privilege has been denied, suspended, 
disqualified, or revoked under this chapter or under the laws of the state in 
which the person's driving privilege was granted and who drives any motor 
vehicle upon the highways of this state while that driving privilege is denied, 
suspended, disqualified, or revoked shall be punished as provided in this 
section. 
(2) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (1), other than a 
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violation specified in Subsection (3), is guilty of a class C misdemeanor. 
§76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and 
interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
§77-17-3. Discharge for insufficient evidence. 
When it appears to the court that there is not sufficient evidence to put a 
defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith order him discharged. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant was charged with four charges: Count 1, Failure to 
Respond to an Officer's Signal to stop, a third degree felony; Count 2, 
Interference with an Arresting Officer, a class B. misdemeanor; Count 3, 
Driving on a Suspended or Revoked License, a class C misdemeanor; and 
Count 4, Speeding, a class C misdemeanor. R. 001-02. A preliminary hearing 
was scheduled for August 2, 2004. The Defendant waived his right to a 
preliminary hearing and pled not guilty. R. 009-011. A jury found the 
Defendant guilty of all charges on January 26, 2005. R. 53-54. The 
Defendant was sentenced on March 14, 2005, to serve a term of zero to five 
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years at the Utah State Prison on the felony charge and the maximum jail 
sentence on the respective misdemeanors. R. 59-61. On April 7, 2005, the 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal. R. 65-66. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The defendant was charged with four charges: Count 1, Failure to 
Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop, a third degree felony; Count 2, 
Interference with an Arresting Officer, a class B. misdemeanor; Count 3, 
Driving on a Suspended or Revoked License, a class C misdemeanor; and 
Count 4, Speeding, a class C misdemeanor. The defendant acknowledged to the 
jury that he was guilty of speeding and driving on revocation (R. 79 / 59). The 
parties stipulated to a driving record that established that the defendant's 
license was revoked at the time of the incident (R. 79 / 51,109). 
On July 8, 2004, Officer Ron VanBeekum, of the South Ogden Police 
Department was watching traffic at Monroe Blvd. and 4200 South (R. 79 / 66). 
This was a residential area, near two schools, and was posted with a speed limit 
of 25 mph (R. 79 / 66, 70). The road is also marked with bright yellow school 
zone signs on both sides of the roadway (R. 79 / 67). 
Shortly after parking, he observed a red vehicle coming at him in a 
northbound direction at a high rate of speed. His initial reaction was "my gad 
that thing is going fast," (R. 79 / 70). The officer's visual estimate was that the 
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vehicle was traveling at a speed of 55 mph, which was later confirmed at 53 
mph by a radar unit that he trained on the red car (R. 79/73, 79). The officer 
activated his overhead lights, his yellow bar lights and his alternating flashing 
headlights and pulled his patrol car out into the northbound lane of travel (R. 
79 / 73, 74). As the defendant approached the officer's vehicle, the officer 
thought he made eye contact and then appeared to accelerate (R. 79 / 76). 
Officer VanBeekum then made a u-turn and began to pursue the vehicle. 
He continued to operate the flashing lights, but never turned on his siren (R. 79 
/ 77). The defendant traveled through four intersections and then pulled into a 
driveway and stopped his car (R. 79/81). The officer pulled his car behind the 
defendant's vehicle and upon observing the defendant exiting his car, also got 
out and ordered the defendant to stop (R. 79 / 84). The officer observed the 
defendant "slows slightly and then continues to walk rapidly like, I give it the 
expression that nothing's going on, what's up, you know, I'm innocent type 
thing. But he continues to walk toward the house/" (R. 79 / 85). 
The officer then grabbed the defendant, pushed him up against the car 
and tried to handcuff him. At that point the officer first identified himself as a 
police officer (R. 79 / 97). The defendant struggled until the officer threatened 
to use pepper spray, at which time the defendant calmed down and the officer 
was able to cuff the defendant (R. 79 / 86, 87). The officer finally told the 
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defendant he was under arrest after he put on the handcuffs (R. 79 / 90). After 
the State rested, the defendant made a motion to dismiss, which was denied by 
the trial court (R. 79/110). 
Defendant's friend Claudia Icedo testified that on the day in question she 
and the defendant had received a phone call that one of the kids had fallen and 
they needed to get back to the house in a hurry (R. 79 / 112). They were each 
driving a car at approximately 50 mph along Monroe Blvd. when she saw the 
officer flip a u-turn in front of her attempting to follow the defendant (R. 79 / 
112). She followed the defendant to the house where she observed the officer 
arresting the defendant (R. 79 / 113). 
Based on the above facts the Defendant was found guilty of all charges. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant acknowledges that the convictions of speeding and 
driving on suspension were appropriate. The convictions for Failure to 
Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop, a third degree felony; and Interference 
with an Arresting Officer requires that the State prove that the defendant have a 
required mens rea of knowledge that the individual attempting the stop or 
effectuating the arrest is a peace officer. For the offense of failure to respond to 
the command of a peace officer contains the requirement that the individual 
know that the person issuing the command is in fact a peace officer. Similarly, 
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the offense of interfering with an arresting officer requires the defendant have 
"knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that 
a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest". 
The Defendant was convicted of these two charges even though the 
evidence that the State presented at trial was insufficient to establish that the 
defendant had the requisite knowledge that the individual was a peace officer. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT 
OF FAILING TO STOP AT THE COMMAND OF A 
POLICE OFFICER AND INTERFERING WITH A LEGAL 
ARREST. 
The Defendant recognizes that in reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence in a jury verdict, the standard of review is narrow. See, State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
An appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. 
State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60, 61 (Utah 1987). As long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, "from which findings of all the 
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requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d at 345. 
The Courts power "to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of 
insufficient evidence is limited." State v. Rudolph, 3 P.3d 192, 196 (2000). 
The Utah Supreme Court has said, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, 
including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State v. 
Mead 21 P.3d 1115, 1132 (Utah 2001) (citations omitted). Additionally, in 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) the Court stated, 
"[o]rdinarily, a reviewing court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the 
evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury 
verdict." 
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient 
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an Appellate Court 
may overturn a conviction. Furthermore, UCA §77-17-3 requires a trial court 
to discharge a defendant where there is "not sufficient evidence" to support a 
conviction. In State v. Workman, infra at 985, the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court's arrest of judgment from a conviction of sexual 
exploitation of a minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is 
based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative 
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possibilities of guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence, 
expert or otherwise, that the photograph in question could have been taken for 
purposes of sexual arousal. Given that lack of evidence the Court vacated the 
defendant's guilty verdict. Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443 (Utah 1983) the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second 
degree murder case where the evidence as to intent was deficient. In that case 
there was undisputed evidence that the victim had been murdered. The sole 
evidence against the defendant consisted of the fact that the defendant was the 
last person seen with the victim, and the fact that he had related a dream to 
three individuals in which he recalled slapping the girl and that he "thought he 
hurt her. He thought he might have killed her." Id. at 446. In that case, the 
Court also stated: 
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In 
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary 
fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean that the court can 
take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a 
verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be 
sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. at 444-445. 
Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94 (Utah 
2002) the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's conviction of evidence 
tampering. In that case, there was some expert testimony that opined that a 
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second, smaller knife had also been used in a murder of an individual. No other 
evidence as to a second weapon (the first weapon was recovered) was found, 
but rather, the prosecution relied on an inference that the defendant had the 
motive and opportunity to dispose of a second weapon. In reversing that 
conviction, the Court held: 
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the 
defendants] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that 
the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the 
evidence supports only the proposition that [the defendant] had the 
opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed 
it ever existed. Id. at 100. 
In State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that "criminal convictions may not be based upon conjectures or 
probabilities and before we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a 
quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged . . . " Id. 
at 402. 
Finally, in the case of State v. Gonzales, 2 P.3d 954 (Utah Ct. App. 
2000) this Court reversed the defendant's conviction of tampering with 
evidence where the State failed to present any credible evidence, other than 
inferences, that the defendant had concealed either a gun or some marijuana 
after an official proceeding had commenced. 
"We will not make speculative leaps across gaps in the 
evidence." State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(internal quotations and alterations omitted). We simply cannot 
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conclude that the State introduced sufficient evidence to support 
all the elements of evidence tampering beyond a reasonable 
doubt. (State v. Gonzales at 959) 
While the Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence 
in support of the jury's verdict, the Defendant submits that even with an 
extensive marshaling of evidence the jury's verdict cannot be supported. 
In the case at bar, the evidence that was presented at trial does not meet 
the statutory elements of intent or knowledge that the officer was in fact an 
officer of the law. Although the defendant recognizes the facts when viewed in 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict would clearly indicate the officer had 
inactivated his overhead lights and that the defendant had possibly made eye 
contact, there is a significant gap between those facts and the establishment of 
knowledge that the officer was an officer of the law. This is particularly true 
given the circumstances as testified to by Claudia Icedo that the defendant had 
moments earlier learned that one of his kids had fallen and had been injured. 
The case at bar is very similar to Gonzales, wherein the State was unable to 
make any connection between the evidence presented at trial and one of the 
critical elements of the offense. It is undisputed that the defendant was 
speeding home to his injured child. It is further undisputed that the defendant 
traveled only a few blocks past the officer and immediately pulled into the 
driveway quickly attempted to proceed into the home. The totality of the 
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evidence should certainly raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable 
juror as to whether or not the defendant had noticed that the car was a marked 
police car. This is further supported by the fact that the officer admitted he 
never activated any siren. Even when the officer testified that upon exiting the 
vehicle and ordering the defendant to stop the defendant continued walking 
quickly, this action could support both theories of the case. At best, the 
evidence "supports only the proposition" (State v. Gonzales infra.) that the 
defendant knew that Officer Van Beekum was in fact a police officer. 
Given that reasonable doubt, the evidence should be determined to be 
insufficient to support a conviction, and the convictions on the evading and the 
interfering with arrest should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Both charges in this case, the failure to stop as well as the interfering 
with arrest require the state prove that the defendant knew that the individual 
involved was a peace officer Although there is no dispute that the defendant 
continued driving to his home upon passing the officer with his overhead lights 
flashing and did not stop of the officer's command as he left his vehicle, the 
element that the defendant knew of the identity of the officer was never proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully 
requests this court to reverse his convictions for failure to stop at a command of 
police officer and resisting arrest. 
DATED this & day of September, 2005/ 
)ALL W>RICHARDS 
Attdrney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Mark Shurtleff, Attorney General, Attorney for thePlaintifO^TEast 300 
South 6th Floor PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah/*^4-0180/postag|e prepaid 
this J^ day of September, 2005. 
)ALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney at Law 
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ADDENDUM 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH MAR 1 7 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL SHAKEEL PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041903949 FS 
Judge: JOHN R MORRIS 
Date: March 14, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: carier 
Prosecutor: SAUNDERS, L. DEAN 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JAMES RETALLICK 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: February 27, 1977 
Video 
Tape Number: M031405 Tape Count: 1057 
CHARGES 
1. FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT COMMAND OF POLIC - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 01/26/2005 Guilty 
2. INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST - Class B Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 01/26/2005 Guilty 
3. DRIVE ON REVOCATION/SUSPENSION/DENIED - Class C Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 01/26/2005 Guilty 
4. SPEEDING - Class C Misdemeanor 
- Disposition: 01/26/2005 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is time set for APP Sentencing. The defendant is present in 
custody from the Weber County Jail. 
Page 1 
or.9 
Case No: 041903949 
Date: Mar 14, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT 
COMMAND OF POLIC a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to 
an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Each count is to run concurrent with each other. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST 
a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 
day(s) 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVE ON 
REVOCATION/SUSPENSION/DENIED a Class C Misdemeanor, the defendant 
is sentenced to a term of 90 day(s) 
Based on the defendant's conviction of SPEEDING a Class C 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 90 day(s) 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
060 
Case No: 041903949 
Date: Mar 14, 2005 
Jail term may be served at the Utah State Prison. 
Dated this I «~ day of rwhttti- , 2o°r . 
JOHN R MORRIS T 
District Court Judge 
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